When is open innovation superior to closed innovation? Through a formal simulation model we show that an open approach to innovation allows the firm to discover combinations of product features that would be hard to envision under integration. However, when partners have divergent goals, open innovation restricts the firm's ability to establish the product's technological trajectory. The resolution of the tradeoff between benefits of discovery and costs of divergence determines the best approach to innovation.
An important unresolved question in technology strategy is whether a firm should take a closed approach to innovation, making all choices regarding product development, or whether, to the contrary, it should open its technology and adopt elements or subsystems developed by other players. Scholars have approached this question by pointing to a fundamental trade-off between adoption and value appropriation (West, 2003) . Shapiro and Varian (1999) , for example, reason that by reducing the risk of supplier holdup, openness fosters adoption and feeds network effects, improving user value created. However, opening a technology often hampers the strength of property rights and impairs the developer's ability to capture value, thus affecting incentives to invest (David & Greenstein, 1990) .
Work empirical in nature, such as that of Cusumano, Mylonadis, and Rosenbloom (1992) , von Burg (2001) , Chesborough (2003 ), von Hippel (2005 , and Boudreau (2006) , provides insights through detailed case descriptions and analyses of open innovation (the embracement of external ideas and knowledge in conjunction with internal R&D [Chesborough, 2003] ) that suggest that openness not only determines the trade-off between adoption and appropriability but also influences the development trajectories that technologies follow over time: openness can stimulate innovation by combining the efforts of a large and diverse pool of complementary firms, leading to increased product diversity and better matching of products and consumer preferences. Greenstein (1996) , however, points out that openness increases coordination costs because it requires the cooperation of multiple suppliers and/or complementors.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to work in this area through the analysis of a simulation model that allows careful consideration of a trade-off that emerges from this body of literature: the benefits of discovery of new combinations of product features brought about by open innovation versus the costs of suboptimal coordination due to divergent objectives. Our argument begins with the observation that when a product or system is opened to outside suppliers or complementors, some choices that could have been made by the original system designer are now undertaken by independent firms that pursue their own interests. Devolving control in this manner has two main effects. First, the system developer loses some freedom to establish the technological trajectory of the system. Restraining this freedom is costly since it amounts to operating under constraints that could have been avoided with a closed approach. Indeed, suppliers and complementors are likely to maximize their own payoffs, not
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those of the original designer. And while there may be some positive correlation between the interests of different industry players, goals generally will not be perfectly aligned. We refer to this effect as divergence.
Second, because independent suppliers and complementors will generally be engaged in product development paths different from those of the original system developer, they are likely to innovate in ways that the system developer would not have chosen. Opening the system may allow the original designer to discover new combinations of product features that would otherwise be hard to foresee. By opening the system up it may be possible to use knowledge of suppliers and/or complementors to end up with a better product. We refer to this effect as discovery.
Divergence and discovery work in opposite directions: there is a trade-off between the cost of losing control of the product's technological trajectory and the benefit of aggregating knowledge from other players to promote innovation. Assuming that other factors are held constant, this trade-off determines whether the original developer will want to open its system or, to the contrary, take a closed approach to innovation.
We present a model that captures these two effects. In a world where firms act to optimize their own payoffs, one is tempted to conclude that firms should do better with closed innovation (full internal control of the product development path). Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the trade-off between discovery and divergence is resolved differently depending on the underlying complexity of the mapping between a firm's choices and the willingness to pay for the product (or perceived value) by customers. In particular, we find that open innovation generally is superior to closed innovation when complexity is not high. This paper complements existing theories by introducing a novel trade-off. To make progress, however, we must abstract from other important factors already addressed in the literature (such as network effects, supplier or complementor holdup, and the effects of property rights on incentives to invest). Formal modeling requires the imposition of important simplifying assumptions.
Close to our view, Chesborough (2003) argues through case evidence that an open approach to innovation encourages firms to incorporate new ideas into their businesses. Moreover, open innovation results in increased competition for resources since internal researchers must compete with external players. While related to Chesborough's, our approach is different in that we present a formal model. Moreover, the simple trade-off that we derive suggests that open innovation is not uniformly superior to closed innovation.
Our theory provides an explanation for why very basic and very complex telephones are designed by companies following a closed approach to innovation. When the level of complexity is intermediate, networks of companies in charge of development come up with better products. More generally, product innovators that push the design frontier, for the most part, follow a closed approach. For example, Apple has followed a closed innovation strategy with the iPod, a product that not only has brought the company back from death but has been acclaimed as best product of the year. Similarly, Nintendo has engaged in closed innovation for its newest videogame system, the Wii. Nintendo's Wii is certainly more innovative than Microsoft's Xbox 360 or Sony's PlayStation 3 (in the sense of delivering new combinations of product features highly valued by customers, such as the role and use of controls).
The paper is organized as follows. We present our model of open versus closed innovation in the following section. Next we describe the mechanics of the simulations. After that we present and interpret the results. We also offer an extension to the benchmark model.
THE MODEL
Our model is a simple extension of NK fitness landscapes. Anderson (1983 Anderson ( , 1985 devised the NK framework to model spin-glass physics, and Kauffman (1993) adapted it to the study of evolutionary biology. Applications to strategy began with the work of Levinthal (1997) and Levinthal and Warglien (1999) and were followed by important work by Rivkin (2000) , Rivkin and Siggelkow (2002) , Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004) , Lenox, Rockart, and Lewin (2006) , and others.
To capture as simply as possible the notions of open and closed development, we consider a product composed of two subsystems, ␣ and ␤. For example, if the product is a PDA, ␣ might represent hardware and ␤ software.
1 Each subsystem can be thought of as a set of features configured in ways chosen by firms. Hardware features may include processor speed, number of pixels in the display, number of color bits, random access memory available, weight, volume, and so forth, whereas software features may include user friendliness of the GUI, the presence of communications utilities or productivity applications, and so on.
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The final product, which we represent by Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ, has N features, and each subsystem is composed of N/2 features. Following the NK framework, each feature can take on one of two possible configurations, 0 or 1. The values 0 and 1 do not necessarily mean the absence or presence of a given feature but, rather, just two different ways in which a particular feature can be configured. A more general model would allow for more than two configurations per feature. The usual 0/1 assumption delivers the simplest, most tractable model.
We assume that different combinations of product features lead to different willingness to pay for the product. That is, there is a mapping between product features and how individuals evaluate the product. For simplicity we assume that this mapping is fixed and does not evolve over time. For some products the mapping is complex, whereas for others it is simple. By complex we mean that minor changes in bundles of features result in drastic changes in perceived value. By simple we mean that the mapping is smooth. As usual in strategy applications of NK fitness landscapes, we consider landscapes exogenous and fixed. However, we should note that with modularity firms can often offer large bundles of features to customers, and then individual customers can choose which features to use. By following this approach, the landscape can be simplified significantly. A discussion of this issue is offered below.
There are many ways in which firms may search for better positions in the landscape. Following the literature, we assume that firms look at all alternatives that are one step away from their current position and select the best alternative.
3 Local search is the simplest search heuristic that captures the idea that firms do not have full knowledge of what combinations of features are most valued by potential customers. With local search, companies move in the landscape by varying one product feature at a time. This search strategy has its roots in optimization, users believing that if every product feature can be optimized or exactly tuned to market needs, then the organization will be able to attain optimal performance. With local search, product design is prone to get trapped into local maxima when the landscape is rugged.
Formally, a product Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ is represented by a vector of N features Ͻs 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N Ͼ, where each s i is an element of {0, 1}. Assuming that N is even, subsystems ␣ and ␤ are ␣ ϭ Ͻs 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N/ 2 Ͼ and
The landscape is constructed as usual. There are 2 N possible product configurations. The contribution c i of each product feature s i to willingness to pay depends on other K components. For each of 2 K possible combinations, a value is drawn from a uniform probability distribution on [0, 1] . The overall willingness to pay associated with Ͻs 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N Ͼ is the average over the N value contributions,
where s i j j ϭ {1, . . . , K} are the configurations of the K features with which s i interacts. We assume random assignment of dependencies (i j are determined randomly in the model).
Having presented the construction of NK landscapes and the mechanics of local search, we 1 A more general model would allow for more than two subsystems. Having two subsystems only captures in a tractable way the essence of the phenomenon that we study.
2 Clearly, each one of these features could itself also be considered a subsystem made up of other product features. For example, at a broad level of aggregation, the presence or not of GUI can be seen as a feature of a given PDA. A more detailed view would consider specific features of the GUI, such as the possibility of having several windows open at the same time or the ease with which the user can browse through different open windows.
are now ready to introduce our models of open and closed innovation.
Our model of closed innovation has firms choosing all features of both subsystems, ␣ and ␤. In other words, the configuration of every feature of the final product Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ is chosen by the firm that brings that product to market. We refer to this regime as closed innovation because the firm has full internal control to determine exactly where in the landscape it ends up.
Under open innovation firms specialize in either the ␣ or the ␤ subsystem and then combine to produce the final product Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ. We call a firm specializing in ␣ a "firm ␣" and one specializing in ␤ a "firm ␤." For firm ␣ to have a complete product it needs to bundle its subsystem with that of a firm ␤. Firm ␣, however, has no control over the configuration of features that make up ␤ since these are chosen by the other firm. Obviously, the willingness to pay for the final product Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ depends on how all of its features are configured: those chosen by firm ␣ and those chosen by firm ␤. Therefore, the willingness to pay for Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ depends on actions taken by two separate firms.
We refer to this regime as open innovation because firms devolve control (partly) of the final product's technological trajectory to other industry players. For example, when Sony decided to adopt IBM's microprocessors for its new generation videogame console, some choices affecting Sony's position on the landscape were made by IBM.
At time zero firms are all distributed randomly in the landscape. In the case of closed innovation, firms search locally for better positions until they reach a (local) maximum. The case of open innovation is a little bit more involved. We must specify (1) how ␣ and ␤ firms are paired and (2) the payoffs to both firm types.
We consider two alternative mechanisms for pairing ␣ and ␤ firms. Both mechanisms have firms randomly paired at time zero, but they differ in what firms are allowed to do over time. Under "fixed partnerships" firms stick to the randomly assigned partner over the entire simulation. Under "flexible partnerships" firms are allowed to change partners: at every stage we allow firms to look at a subset of available partners and pair with the one that leads to highest fitness.
These two mechanisms are extremes in a continuum. In most cases reality falls in between: firms do not change partner(s) everyday, but new relationships are built when it becomes clear there is a better alternative. For example, for many years Apple computers were shipped with IBM PowerPC microprocessors, but in 2006 Apple began using Intel processors. To a large extent Apple's decision to switch was based on the better integration and performance of its OS X on Intel architecture microprocessors.
In the case of closed innovation, the payoff associated with product Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ corresponds to the height of the landscape at the N features that define it. Formally, the payoff associated with Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ (ϵ Ͻs 1 , s 2 
In the case of open innovation, a given firm ␣ incorporates a ␤ subsystem (or, equivalently, a given firm ␤ incorporates an ␣ subsystem) and brings the complete product Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ to market. In this case firm ␣ (or firm ␤) cares about the willingness to pay for the complete final product (composed of N features). Thus, willingness to pay is computed just as in the case of closed innovation (Equation 1).
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Note that payoffs to partners do not coincide typically. A given firm ␣ (call it firm ␣ 1 ) may incorporate the ␤ subsystem produced by firm ␤ 1 and bring product Ͻ␣ 1 , ␤ 1 Ͼ to market. That particular ␤ firm (call it firm ␤ 1 ) may incorporate a different ␣ subsystem in the product it commercializes, perhaps that of firm ␣ 2 ( ␣ 1 ). If this is the case, firm ␤ 1 will sell product Ͻ␣ 2 , ␤ 1 Ͼ. As a consequence, the willingness to pay for the products brought to market by firms ␣ 1 and ␤ 1 will typically not coincide since, in most cases, the products will be different.
An example of our model of open innovation is that of motor coach manufacturing, which is divided into two central activities: the construction of the chassis (␣) and the construction of the bus body (␤). Manufacturers of bus chassis sell 4 More formally, consider firm ␣. Suppose that it configures ␣ as Ͻs 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N/2 Ͼ and that it is paired up with a firm ␤ that has configured ␤ as Ͻs N/2ϩ1 , s N/2ϩ2 , . . . , s N Ͼ. The willingness to pay for the product that firm ␣ brings to market (the combination of ␣ and ␤),
the chassis complete with the engine to a bus body manufacturer, who adds the top section and completes the interior of the coach. In recent years the separation of the two activities has become more widespread, with larger companies supplying the chassis and making agreements to partner with bus body manufacturers (CasadesusMasanell & Mitchell, 2007) .
The Appendix presents a summary of the model, its main elements, and assumptions. The performance measure that we use to compare closed and open approaches to innovation is average fitness.
An example of an industry where open and closed innovation have occurred simultaneously is the PDA industry. 5 In the mid 1980s Psion released the Psion Organiser. It included 2K of RAM and 4K of applications in ROM. The idea was to provide a portable machine that would have the ability to retain data. Psion offered additional packs, which included a programming language as well as mathematical and financial functions. Entry intensified by the late 1980s, both with DOS clone devices by HP and Compaq and electronic organizers by Sharp and Casio. By the end of 1991, Sharp and Casio led the market in electronic organizers. All of these products had been designed and released without involvement from outside firms. Thus, each manufacturer took a closed approach to innovation.
On the open innovation front, several large electronics enterprises, computing companies, and venture capital firms formed alliances to further the development of 16-bit handheld computers. Among them, IBM financially backed the young start-up GO Corporation in the late 1980s to develop PenPoint, a pen-based OS. Later, GO Corporation partnered with AT&T, although that partnership ended because of mistrust, time delays in meeting targets, and disagreements on product development. At the same time, IBM set its sights on developing a handheld computer with phone capabilities. It worked with BellSouth to develop Simon. However, the device was seen as too heavy and was ineffective in administering phone calls and computing functions at the same time.
All of these early open development efforts failed. According to an industry observer, It's kind of like a rock-and-roll group. You get five guys and they all start off with the same goal, but sooner or later somebody wants to do his own thing. Competition [within the alliance] can make things difficult, and sometimes whatever they're rallying around doesn't prove to be what they thought it was going to be (Duffy, 1993: 32) .
The success of Sharp's Zaurus and Casio's BOSS in the early days of the industry suggests that closed innovation was a superior development approach at the time. We will see below that open innovation is generally inferior to closed innovation when complexity is high; we argue that complexity (as perceived by the firms) is likely to decrease with technological progress.
SIMULATION MECHANICS
All simulations have N ϭ 16. For each K ϭ 1 . . . 15 we do the following 50 times: generate a landscape and release 100 firms that search for highest fitness under both closed and open innovation. For any given landscape let CLO be the average fitness of firms engaged in closed innovation and let OPE be the average fitness of firms engaged in open innovation. For each landscape we compute the difference in average fitness, OPE Ϫ CLO. Because for each K we have fifty landscapes, we generate fifty differences in average fitness (OPE Ϫ CLO). We compute the average and variance of OPE Ϫ CLO for each K. A positive and significantly different from zero average indicates superiority of open innovation.
Closed Innovation
For every landscape 100 firms are released at random locations. Firms search for better positions by evaluating all local alternatives and adjusting any one of N product features. The simulation ends when all 100 firms settle down-that is, when no firm has the desire to further modify product features.
Open Innovation-Fixed Partnerships
For every landscape 100 firms are released at random locations. Each firm is one of two possible types, ␣ or ␤. Firm type is assigned randomly (0.5 probability of either type). Therefore, about 50 of 100 firms are of type ␣ and about 50 of type ␤. In most cases, however, the split is not perfectly symmetrical (because it is probabilistic).
To have a complete product, a firm ␣ must pair with a firm ␤, and vice versa. We assume that the pairing (which occurs at time zero) is random and that, once paired, the two firms remain together for the entire simulation. We also assume that each firm searches to maximize its own fit, without taking into consideration how its choices affect the fit of its partner. In every iteration firms search for higher positions by evaluating all local alternatives (for those features that they control) and adjusting any one of the available N/2 product features.
In this simple model firms have one partner only. But because partners are assigned randomly, a given firm can be a partner of more than one firm. As a consequence, we have relatively large networks of firms being formed. Once every firm has modified one product feature (staying put is also a possibility), products Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ are assembled. The fitness levels associated with the new products are recorded. At this point a new iteration begins. Notice the implicit assumptions that (1) choices are made simultaneously by all agents and that (2) each firm takes the other firm's prior choices as given in evaluating alternatives.
The procedure is repeated until the system settles down (no firm desires to reconfigure product features under its control). At this point the simulation stops and end point fitness is recorded. Since this model does not always settle down, the simulations are stopped after 200 iterations if needed (this happens occasionally and only when K is high). 
FIGURE 1 Random Network of Firms Open Innovation-Flexible Partnerships
In this case, in every iteration and before they choose whether or not to modify product features, firms are allowed to change partners. The set of available partners (which we call "partner opportunity set") is composed of all firms of complementary type.
7 That is, ␣ firms are allowed to choose any one of about fifty ␤ subsystems to combine with their product. 8 The same holds for ␤ firms. Notice the trivial fact that firm ␣'s desire to partner with a given firm ␤ does not necessarily imply that firm ␤ prefers that particular firm ␣ over all firms with an ␣ product. The model of flexible partnerships possibly generates a different network in every iteration: the network evolves over time as new desirable partnerships are formed.
RESULTS
We begin by comparing the outcomes of closed and open innovation when partnerships are fixed. We then consider the case of flexible partnerships.
Open versus Closed Innovation When Partnerships Are Fixed
When partnerships are fixed, open innovation outperforms closed innovation for low and medium-low levels of complexity. Devolving control to industry players appears to be a better approach to product development when the landscape is rugged (Figure 2 ). We also find that when complexity is high, closed innovation is a superior development approach. Specifically, Description: For each K ϭ 1 . . . 15 we do the following 50 times: generate a landscape and release 100 firms that search for highest fitness under both closed and open innovation (fixed partnerships). Let CLO be the average fitness of firms engaged in closed innovation and OPE be the average fitness of firms engaged in open innovation. For each landscape we compute the difference in average fitness, OPE Ϫ CLO. Because for each K we have fifty landscapes, we generate fifty differences in average fitness (OPE Ϫ CLO). The figure plots the average of OPE Ϫ CLO for each K. At K ϭ 3, for example, average fitness under closed innovation is 0.9014 (with variance .00075), and under open innovation it is 0.9317 (with variance .00098). The difference is .0303. The t-statistic of OPE -CLO is 5.59, and, thus, it is significantly different from zero. The bars are standard errors of the mean.
Interpretation: Open innovation outperforms closed innovation for low-mid values of K.
when K approaches N/3, the performance of open innovation decays abruptly. From that point on the best approach to product development is closed innovation. We note that this result is consistent with an observation by Boudreau (2006) , who, citing the work of Teece (1996) , Novak and Eppinger (2001) , Christensen, Verlinden, and Westerman (2002) , Brusoni (2005) , and Macher (2006) , asks if opening a technology to outsiders stimulates innovation and concludes that for innovations that require "changes involving the interactions and dependencies among components [corresponding in our model to large K], the consensus is that it does not" (2006: 2). He concludes that innovations where there is high interdependency between components require "a guiding hand that can internalize externalities, centralize authority, and promote knowledge sharing among various development activities" (2006: 2).
Discovery and Divergence: Benefits and Costs of Open Innovation
We now investigate the comparative benefits and costs of open innovation. With open innovation the original product developer loses some control compared to closed design. This devolving of control has two main effects:
• Discovery: Open innovation may allow the system designer to discover new combinations of product features that would otherwise be hard to foresee.
• Divergence: The system developer loses the freedom to establish the product's willingness-to-pay trajectory. There are product features that the firm might want to reconfigure, but it is unable to do so because they are controlled by another firm that acts to maximize its own payoffs.
The trade-off between discovery and divergence determines the desirability of open versus closed innovation. We now proceed to quantify discovery and divergence to gain insight on what drives the result that open innovation may sometimes outperform closed innovation. To make progress we introduce a supercharged firm. This is a firm engaged in closed innovation that can see beyond incremental change. Specifically, the supercharged firm is allowed to make one change in the first N/2 choices and one change in the second N/2 choices (simultaneously). The supercharged firm may reconfigure one product feature only if it desires to do so.
Let SCH be the performance of the supercharged firm, CLO be the performance of firms engaged in closed innovation, and OPE be the performance of firms engaged in open innovation. We quantify discovery and divergence as follows:
What do these definitions capture? Consider discovery first. Closed firms can reconfigure one product feature only in each period, whereas open firms can make two decisions in each period. 9 For example, let's use N ϭ 4 for ease of notation. If the firm currently sits at 0000, a closed firm can only move to 1000, 0100, 0010, or 0001. In contrast, an open firm could move to 1001, for instance. Clearly, the difference in performance between supercharged firms and closed firms is a measure of discovery as generated by the ability to make changes that are not entirely incremental.
The supercharged firm does not perform like the open firm either, since in this case the individual firms (␣ and ␤) care about their own performance, rather than about firm performance. This performance difference then is a measure of divergent objectives or divergence (as we call it).
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The total effect of open innovation is the discovery benefit plus the divergence cost:
Figure 3 shows discovery and divergence for the four model specifications. Notice that discovery is always positive. This is expected since the supercharged firm can always replicate the actions of the closed firm: if it chooses different feature combinations, it must mean that such 9 To simplify the exposition we refer to firms engaged in closed innovation as closed firms and those engaged in open innovation as open firms. 10 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these definitions and the introduction of the supercharged firm. combinations lead to higher fitness.
11 Discovery grows with the ruggedness of the landscape. As K grows, being able to "see" two steps ahead prevents the firm from being trapped onto low local maxima more and more often because the number of local maxima increases with K.
Contrary to discovery, divergence is sometimes positive (a benefit) and sometimes negative (a cost)-that is, in some instances divergence results in better performance than the supercharged firm. The reason for this is that there are two (countervailing) effects at work for the open firms. One is the problem of not coordinating across the firms. The second effect, however, is a positive one: being parochial can lead to more discovery (see Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003) .
Notice that the divergence cost could, in some instances, be overcome if the focal firm offered its partner a higher price to make specific changes. This would happen only when the specific changes led to superior total value created; that is, the reduction in the partner's product willingness to pay from configuring features in a way that was suboptimal from its viewpoint would have to be more than offset by the increase in willingness to pay of the focal firm's product (after the additional changes had been made). Of course, if we allowed the focal firm to identify changes in the partner's product that were beneficial in this global sense, it would be as if the focal firm could "see" the landscape around the partner's location. Our assumption, however, is that each partner can only see the effects on willingness to pay of changes on the features that they control. Also, allowing negotiation for feature configuration when mutually beneficial would move us away from a world where each firm chose product features to fur-11 A constrained optimization problem has a better solution the fewer the number of constraints. In our NK setting, allowing two changes instead of one in every period is tantamount to dealing with a constrained optimization problem with fewer constraints. Description: For each K ϭ 1 . . . 15 we do the following 50 times: generate a landscape and release 100 firms that search for highest fitness under closed innovation, open innovation (fixed partnerships), and as supercharged firms. Let CLO be the average fitness of firms engaged in closed innovation, OPE be the average fitness of firms engaged in open innovation, and SCH be the average fitness of supercharged firms. For each landscape we compute Discovery ϭ SCH Ϫ CLO and Divergence ϭ OPE Ϫ SCH. Because for each K we have fifty landscapes, we generate fifty data points for discovery and divergence for each level of complexity. The figure plots average discovery and average divergence for each K. It also plots the total effect: Total Effect ϭ Discovery Ϫ Divergence.
Interpretation: The benefits of discovery and the costs of divergence increase with K.
ther their strict best interest. Finally, consideration of money transfers would introduce considerations of value capture and bargaining that, for tractability, we have sidestepped.
Open versus Closed Innovation When
Partnerships Are Flexible Figure 4 shows that with flexible partnerships the gains are larger than in the case of fixed partnerships. In fact, open innovation outperforms closed innovation even for large K.
The advantage of open innovation with flexible partnerships can be explained with a simple thought experiment. Imagine that we separate the product into N parts (one part for each decision), with each firm doing one part (i.e., we have N firms in any partnership, not just two firms). We create two firms for each of the N parts and have those two firms do that part differently. Then we let each firm recombine with the best possible partners. If we do this, we will effectively be allowing each firm to optimize over N Ϫ 1 decisions through partner selection. That should get us pretty close to the optimal performance even at fairly high N, being surpassed only by a firm that hit the optimal over all N decisions. Thus, the more finely we cut up the product, the closer we get to global optimization. Splitting the decision in two and allowing partial flexibility in choosing partners (as we do in the paper) is just one step closer to optimization.
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Splitting the firms and then assuming they recombine optimally or nearly optimally is equivalent to allowing firms to select the right partners externally. Our model of closed innovation, on the other hand, implicitly assumes that firms have very limited ability to select the right complementary practices internally (by complementary practices we mean the bundle of product 12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for presenting this argument. features configured by the partner firm). The reason why such complementary practices are hard to select internally is that often they are "far away" from current internal practices (which are assigned randomly at time zero and evolve through local search), and local search does not typically lead to such optimal configurations.
The advantage of open innovation with flexible partnerships that we find in this model is from the assumption that firms are better at selecting complementary partners than they are at selecting complementary practices. One way to think about the limitations imposed by closed innovation is that firms cannot "imagine" all the possible bundles of complementary practices. All they can imagine are those complementary practices that are one step ahead of the current configuration. Open innovation allows firms to see beyond current practice and understand that important improvement can be realized.
The model of flexible partnerships effectively says, "If you can't figure out how to put the pieces together internally (configure two subsystems optimally), it is critical to have lots of different pieces (complementary subsystems) to choose from and know how to put them together externally." The more pieces there are to choose from (as implied by a larger partner opportunity set), the better open innovation will perform. Consistent with this reasoning, Figure 5 shows that when the partner opportunity set is open, the improvement in performance is due to less severe divergence costs.
Fixed versus Flexible Partnerships-Two Ends of a Continuum
Open innovation performs better with flexible partnerships than with fixed partnerships. Our model of flexible partnerships is extreme in that Description: For each K ϭ 1 . . . 15 we do the following 50 times: generate a landscape and release 100 firms that search for highest fitness under closed innovation, open innovation (flexible partnerships), and as supercharged firms. Let CLO be the average fitness of firms engaged in closed innovation, OPE be the average fitness of firms engaged in open innovation, and SCH be the average fitness of supercharged firms. For each landscape we compute Discovery ϭ SCH Ϫ CLO and Divergence ϭ OPE Ϫ SCH. Because for each K we have fifty landscapes, we generate fifty data points for discovery and divergence for each level of complexity. The figure plots average discovery and average divergence for each K. It also plots the total effect: Total Effect ϭ Discovery Ϫ Divergence.
Interpretation: The benefits of discovery increase with K. Compared with Figure 3 , we see that the negative effects of divergence decay substantially when the partner opportunity set grows from 0 percent to 100 percent. the opportunity set of possible partners consists of all firms producing complementary products. In other words, a given firm ␣ is allowed to partner with any one of about fifty firms ␤, and vice versa. In reality, physical distance, capacity constraints, reputation, and the like will reduce the cardinality of this set. We now investigate how sensitive the results of flexible partnerships are to changes in the cardinality of this set.
Toward this end, we reran the models of flexible partnerships with randomly selected groups of 10, 25, 50, and 75 percent of complementary firms. Notice that the cases of fixed partnerships and flexible partnerships analyzed above are particular cases corresponding to opportunity sets of 0 and 100 percent, respectively. Figure 6 shows the progression from fixed to flexible. Notice that in the simulations with 100 firms, when the partner opportunity set increases to 10 percent, closed innovation beats open innovation only for K Ն 9, and as the partner opportunity grows larger, so does the minimum K such that closed innovation beats open innovation.
Summary
We end this section with succinct statements of our two main results. 
DISCUSSION

On the Evolution of Complexity
We have assumed that the mapping between product features and willingness to pay is objective and does not change over time. It would seem natural to assume that even when the true mapping is complex, firms may want to think of it as simple. How can firms think of a complex map as simple? Firms could just configure all product features to their "maximum" as having "more of everything" should always be desirable to customers. That is, even if some of the features are not valued much by customers, making them available should not detract from willingness to pay. The optimal strategy in this case is to configure all product features individually in as full-fledged a way as possible.
While this approach may be valid in some instances, quite often "simplifying the complex" in this manner is not feasible. The reason is that the state of technology forces trade-offs between features. As new features are added, the product is likely to become less desirable in some dimensions. In the PDA example, adding powerful, long-lasting batteries (a desirable feature) generally means having a more voluminous PDA (an undesirable feature). When the firm is forced to make these sorts of trade-offs, a complex mapping between features and willingness to pay cannot be simplified as suggested above. Interpretation: As the partner opportunity set expands, so does the minimum level of complexity such that open innovation leads to better performance than closed innovation. Open innovation does better than closed innovation for all levels of K when partnerships are open to a randomly selected group of 50 percent of complementary firms. We also note that the evolution of performance of open innovation for low values of K is not monotonic.
When technological trade-offs force the firm to offer specific bundles, complexity has a bite.
As the state of technology improves, these trade-offs become less binding, allowing firms to offer more complete products (with "more" of all features). From the firm's viewpoint, technological evolution can have the effect of simplifying the landscape. Consider again the case of PDAs. When PDAs were first brought to market, technology limitations forced heavy compromises between features, most obviously between hardware and software. As technology evolved, trade-offs became less severe. In the extreme, one can imagine a day when processing speed, RAM, storage, battery life, and other features become unlimited (for all practical purposes); if this ever happens, the mapping, as evaluated by the firm, will have become "simpler," even if it truly remains complex.
We conclude that K (as perceived by the firm) is likely to decrease with technological progress (better written software, modularization, etc.). The model's predictions are in this sense consistent with the stylized facts documented by Boudreau (2006) , who found that early in the life of a system, closed development leads to more successful innovation, and later, when complexity lessens, open development is generally more successful. Specifically, when complexity is low, all industry participants agree on what the "right" design should be. As a consequence, the cost of devolving control is low since partnering firms will want to make choices similar to those the original system developer would have made in the first place. And even when the choice is not exactly the same, willingness to pay for the system is close to that of the best design because landscape ruggedness is low. Moreover, the additional learning that comes from having others codevelop the system (discovery) is low. In this case there will be near indifference between open and closed development. Both approaches will fare equally well.
On Competitive Interaction
Because payoffs are interdependent, the models of open innovation that we have considered have firms interacting. Notice that the position on the landscape of a firm ␣ is determined partly by its own choices (features 1 through 8) and partly by the choices of the firm ␤ with which it is paired (features 9 through 16). Moreover, we have assumed that every firm configures product features under its control to maximize its own fit.
The approach is thus similar to game theory models of competitive interaction. Our model of open innovation can be seen as a modest attempt to bring closer together strategic interaction (à la game theory) and NK fitness landscapes, in line with arguments in Levinthal and Warglein (1999) . 13 One important critique of the application of NK fitness landscapes to the study of business strategy is that it was originally devised for the study of physics and genetics, not strategic interaction. Most applications to strategy thus far have not explicitly considered strategic interaction between players: the actions of a player do not affect the position of other players on the landscape. One important exception is the work of Lenox et al. (2006) . 14 We believe that the integration of NK fitness landscapes and game theory is a promising area of research that can potentially inform many aspects of firm strategy that have thus far been analyzed assuming away the effects of competitive interaction.
EXTENSION: SALE TO OEM
We now study an alternative way to pair ␣ and ␤ firms. In this extension, which we call "sale to OEM," firms ␣ and ␤ sell their subsystems to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who assemble them into a final product that is sold to consumers.
Simulation Mechanics
The simulations are basically the same as those of the benchmark model studied above. The main difference is that because firms sell the subsystems to the OEM, we assume that 13 There are important differences between our approach and standard game theory. Most important, in our approach firms do not see the entire landscape; they see only their local environment. In addition, firms do not try to anticipate their partners' behavior when making their own choices.
14 In their model firms make two decisions. First, they choose a set of activities that determine their marginal cost. Second, they compete in the marketplace by choosing quantities. Marginal cost is modeled as the height of an NK landscape. An important difference between Lenox et al. (2006) and our paper is that Lenox et al. model competitive interaction as a Cournot game. component manufacturers are concerned about the contribution to willingness to pay of the N/2 features that they directly control. For example, in the case of a firm ␣, this is computed as follows: is the WTP for the ␤ subsystem (produced by a firm ␤), and it is computed similarly to that for ␣. Figure 7 summarizes the differences between the various models of open innovation that are considered in the paper. What are the particular ␣ and ␤ subsystems assembled by OEMs in this model? Under fixed partnerships subsystems ␣ and ␤ are given to the OEM at time zero. The OEM is stuck with those particular systems for the rest of the simulation. Under flexible partnerships each component manufacturer looks at all manufacturers of complementary subsystems and picks the one such that a combination with its product will result in the most valuable complete system. For example, a given ␣ firm picks the ␤ firm such that Ͻ␣, ␤Ͼ results in the highest possible fit. The reason for this pairing is that if a particular OEM picked that specific ␣, it would be pairing it with precisely that ␤ subsystem because that combination would lead to maximal fit. In choosing what product features to modify, however, firm ␣ considers only the contributions of features 1 through N/2 (those features that compose the product that the firm sells to the OEM).
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In the model of flexible partnerships, payoffs are computed twice-once by the suppliers (this computation guides search) and once by the OEM (this guides supplier pairing). In the first computation Equation 2 is used; in the second Equation 1 is used.
Results
OEM assembly from fixed pairs of firms leads to disastrous performance, regardless of com-plexity (Figure 8) . To see why, recall that in the model of the OEM, no attempt is made by firms ␣ and ␤ to coordinate product designs. A given firm ␣, for example, does not take into account how the configuration of the components under its control affect the contributions of the N/2 product features under the control of the ␤ firm with which it is paired (because these do not enter its payoff). 17 The OEM is stuck with two interdependent subsystems that evolve independently of one another, resulting in ruinous performance.
When OEMs can choose which components to assemble, the model delivers superior performance (compared to closed innovation) when K is large (Figure 9 ). In this case, even as subsystems ␣ and ␤ evolve independently, OEMs choose the best possible match at every stage. When K is high, the model generates many assemblies and disassemblies of ␣ and ␤ components and, thus, a lot of variability in the available subsystems for assembly. A consequence of all this variation is that better systems can be assembled, leading to superior performance. When K is low, there are few local maxima and firms settle quickly. The firm ends up at conditional local maxima. The quality of these maxima would be high if there were a large set of possible configurations of the conditioning features (those controlled by the other firm) to choose from (by switching partners). Because K is low, however, there is not much variability. As a consequence, performance ends up not being great for the open firm. Description: For each K ϭ 1 . . . 15 we do the following 50 times: generate a landscape and release 100 firms that search for highest fitness under closed innovation, open innovation (sale to OEM and fixed partnerships), and as supercharged firms. Let CLO be the average fitness of firms engaged in closed innovation, OPE be the average fitness of firms engaged in open innovation, and SCH be the average fitness of supercharged firms. For each landscape we compute Discovery ϭ SCHϪ CLO and Divergence ϭ OPE Ϫ SCH. Because for each K we have fifty landscapes, we generate fifty data points for discovery and divergence for each level of complexity. The figure plots average discovery and average divergence for each K. It also plots the total effect: Total Effect ϭ Discovery Ϫ Divergence.
Interpretation: Open innovation (sale to OEM and fixed partnerships) underperforms closed innovation for all levels of K.
In addition to comparing the performance of sale to OEM to closed innovation, it is useful to compare the two models of open innovationthe benchmark model (where partners bring complete products to market) and sale to OEM (where OEMs assemble components produced by independent firms). The simulations show that the benchmark model outperforms the model of sale to OEM. This is somewhat puzzling because when partnerships are flexible, OEMs pick the single best possible combination of two partners. Why would the best combination of two partners ever be outperformed by any other mix of partners?
In the benchmark model each firm takes into consideration the choices made by its current partner (thus searching for improvements that enhance the whole, given the partner). The sale to OEM model is at the other extreme: firms do not take into consideration the choices made by their current partner in searching for improvements to the product. In reality, firms that sell to an OEM will take such choices into consideration and optimize accordingly. If in the model of sale to OEM we allowed partners to consider each other's feature configurations when making their choices, we would end up with a model very similar to the benchmark.
The result that the benchmark model outperforms the model of sale to OEM may depend on the total number of firms in the industry. As the number of firms rises, so also rise the odds that OEMs can find combinations of partners that result in products with high willingness to pay (even though component firms have not coordinated in any way). However, firms innovating through the benchmark model with a complete product will also be able to combine with more partners and end up in better positions. Therefore, there is no clear-cut prediction as to the evolution of the relative advantage of each model of open innovation when the number of potential partners increases.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a model that suggests that discovery might arise not from the exercise of full strategic freedom (being able to choose all N product features) but from restricting the available choices and learning from those made by others. An open innovation strategy allows the firm to discover areas of the product landscape that would be hard to imagine otherwise. As partners seek better positions, the focal firm discovers locations in the landscape that it may never have reached had it been in charge of all choices. In a sense, the search that our models of open innovation generate is similar to the cognitive search in Gavetti and Levinthal (2000) . These authors allow firms to search by performing long jumps to regions of the landscape that are characterized, on average, by high fitness. In our case the nonincremental moves in the landscape are not the result of better cognition but, rather, of making use of other players' knowledge.
We end by pointing out that the model has important limitations. Most important, our model is one of value creation, not value capture.
18 Questions such as, "Might it not be much more profitable to be an average closed firm than one beholden to a specific supplier or set of suppliers?" and "How would this affect both the advisability of different approaches and the likelihood that firms adopt one approach or another?" cannot be addressed with our model. To properly address issues of value capture, we would need to make assumptions regarding (1) bargaining power between customers and firms, (2) intensity of competition between firms as a function of how similar their products are (how far or close in the landscape the products are), and (3) bargaining power between ␣ and ␤ firms that are paired together. The increased complexity may blur the mechanism for value creation that we have fleshed out (the trade-off between discovery and divergence). The study of value capture is important but complex, and we relegate it to a different paper.
By focusing on the trade-off between discovery and divergence, we have assumed away other factors that affect the relative attractiveness of open versus closed innovation. These include (1) user adoption and network effects; (2) the opportunity to refocus internal resources on finding, screening, and managing implementation; (3) the sense of urgency for internal groups to act on ideas or technology; and (4) the creation of a culture that fosters innovation. The upside of limiting the analysis in this way is that it allows us to understand in-depth one mechanism affecting the choice between both approaches to innovation. In applying our results to real managerial settings, however, one must be careful not to discount other factors affecting the attractiveness of each development method. These factors interact, sometimes nontrivially, with the mechanism introduced in this paper.
Our model suggests that researchers investigating user-driven innovation (e.g., see Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2007; Jeppesen, 2005; Jeppesen & Molin, 2003; Shah & Franke, 2003) and looking into the relationship among collective knowledge sharing, product development, and innovation may find it helpful to consider the complexity of the mapping between product features and customer value created as a factor that can potentially moderate the effects of user contributions to product innovation. Likewise, our model (which has firms, not users, innovating) could be extended to a setting where ideas generated by users can be incorporated into the product. Obviously, the distinction between user-driven innovation and innovation by firms becomes especially important if value capture is explicitly considered.
The presence of strong network effects may lead to a winner-take-all dynamic. In this case quickly generating differential willingness to pay is especially important. The literature has considered a number of mechanisms to raise willingness to pay in such settings, including (1) the deepening of network effects (through low prices, wider distribution, and the like; Arthur 1989 Arthur , 1994 Shapiro & Varian, 1999) , (2) managing expectations to draw adoption by customers and complementors (Church & Gandal, 2005; Farrell & Klemperer, 2007) , and (3) investing to produce a higher-quality product (Jacobson & Aaker, 1985; Rangan & Adner 2001; Sethi, 2000) . Our argument suggests that one 18 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. additional mechanism that is available (when complexity is not too high) is open innovation. To the extent that there is a large pool of firms available to act as innovation partners (which increases the likelihood that open innovation will generate large increases in value), open innovation may neutralize efforts by competitors to raise willingness to pay through other mechanisms.
One implication of the models with flexible partnerships that we have presented is that having a large network of firms ready to collaborate for innovation can be highly beneficial, regardless of the level of complexity that characterizes the mapping between product features and willingness to pay. As a consequence, having the capability to manage such networks is essential for our arguments to apply. Ecosystem-promoting actions, such as Intel's setup of Intel Capital (a venture capital company formed in the early 1990s to stimulate advances in computing by investing in start-ups), not only have the benefit of potentially strengthening indirect network effects but also should lead to improved innovation (Intel benefits from the diversity of knowledge of firms in the portfolio). In other words, large ecosystems of firms around a platform not only help exploit network effects but also result in enhanced product innovation when the platform has the capability to manage such relationships.
APPENDIX MODEL SUMMARY AND MAIN ASSUMPTIONS
• A product is composed of N ϭ 16 features. ⅙ s i represents feature i ʦ {1, 2, . . . , 16}. ⅙ Product features can take one of two possible configurations: s i ʦ {0, 1}. ⅙ Thus, a product is a sequence of sixteen digits taking values 0 or 1. For example, Ͻs 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s 16 Ͼ ϭ Ͻ1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1Ͼ is one product. There are 2 16 ϭ 65,536 possible products.
• Product features are divided into two groups: features 1 through 8 and features 9 through 16. These groups represent two different subsystems. Two subsystems put together is a final product. ⅙ The subsystem composed of features 1 through 8 (Ͻs 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s 8 Ͼ) is called ␣ and that composed of features 9 through 16 (Ͻs 9 , s 10 , s 11 , . . . , s 16 Ͼ) is called ␤.
⅙ There are three types of firms: ▪ A closed firm is one that controls all sixteen product features. ▪ An ␣ firm is one that controls an ␣ subsystem. ▪ A ␤ firm is one that controls a ␤ subsystem. ▪ An ␣ firm must incorporate the subsystem produced by a ␤ firm to have a final product for sale (and vice versa).
• Every product Ͻs 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s 16 Ͼ has some willingness to pay associated with it. ⅙ The contribution to willingness to pay of a particular product feature, s i , depends on the configurations of K other features (0 Յ K Ͻ N). The particular K features that interact for willingness to pay are assigned randomly. ⅙ The contribution to willingness to pay for the final product of subsystem ␣ is N .
• At the beginning of each simulation, products are randomly assigned to firms. Firms then search incrementally for better posi-tions in the willingness to pay landscape. Their goal is to have a product with as high a willingness to pay as possible. ⅙ Firms are allowed to reconfigure one feature at a time (among those features they control). ⅙ Firms stop searching when incremental search does not lead to a product with higher willingness to pay.
• Innovation takes place as firms search for and find better positions in the landscape. ⅙ Closed innovation is modeled by a closed firm searching for better positions by fully controlling internally all of the sixteen product features. ⅙ Open innovation is modeled by an ␣ firm (paired with a ␤ firm) searching for better positions by controlling internally features 1 through 8 only (similar to a ␤ firm).
